Biased expert witnesses pose a distinct challenge to the legal system. In the criminal sphere, they have contributed to several wrongful convictions, and in civil cases, they can protract disputes and reduce faith in the legal system. This has inspired a great deal of legal-psychological research studying expert biases and how to mitigate them. In response to the problem of biased experts, courts have historically employed procedural mechanisms to manage partiality, but have generally refrained from using exclusionary rules. Canada diverged from this position in 2015, developing an exclusionary rule in White Burgess
jurisprudence. The data suggests that White Burgess increased the frequency of challenges related to expert biases, however, did not noticeably affect the proportion of experts that were excluded. This suggests that the exclusionary rule introduced in White Burgess did not significantly impact the practical operation of expert evidence law, as it pertains to bias. We conclude by recommending that one way for courts to better address the problem of biased experts is to recognize the issue of contextual bias.
I. INTRODUCTION
ne of the most formidable hurdles in generating and conveying knowledge is curbing one's own biases; we often see what we want to see. 1 This can occur unintentionally and even unconsciously. 2 In law, many wrongful accusations and convictions have been attributed to biased expert judgments (we will parse the term "bias" in Part II). 3 In this vein, a great deal of recent research in the field of psychology and law has misguided. 7 Despite the threat they can pose to justice, experts often carry a lot of weight in the trial process, possessing knowledge the judge and jury cannot be expected to have. 8 As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada, in WBLI, was faced with a difficult task: in an adversarial system that is inherently inundated with bias, how much bias is too much? Or, put differently, when should trial judges intervene if it seems likely that the expert is biased and partial?
In what follows, we will first review the ways in which experts can become biased (Part II) and how courts have traditionally approached these issues (Part III). Then, in Part IV, we will discuss the Canadian approach for dealing with this issue, as it was laid down in WBLI. Part V includes an empirical analysis of the pre-and post WBLI case law, finding that any effect WBLI had on the biased expert witness jurisprudence was likely insignificant. Part VI concludes and offers some preliminary reflections on how courts in the future can more effectively deal with expert bias.
II. A PANOPLY OF BIASES
I propose that people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster of the evidence to support it. In other words, they maintain an 'illusion of objectivity'. To this end, they search memory for those beliefs and rules that could support their desired conclusion. They may also creatively combine accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that could logically support their desired conclusion. It is this process of memory search and belief construction that is biased by directional goals. The objectivity of this justification construction is illusory because people do not realize that the process is biased by their goals, that they are accessing only a subset of their relevant knowledge, that they would probably access different beliefs and rules in the presence of different directional goals, and they might even be capable of justifying opposite conclusions on different occasions. 9
Before discussing the Canadian approach and its effectiveness, it will be useful to parse the various types of biases and causes of bias that scholars and courts have considered. Moreover, we will explain that biases are extensive and pernicious. 10 As Ziva Kunda describes in the above quote, cognitive scientific research finds that these biases can contaminate the expert's memory and reasoning processes in ways they cannot know. 11 Experts may therefore labour under what psychologists term a "bias blind spot" resulting in the "illusion of objectivity." 12 In law, this can result in expert witnesses seeing their own field and work as balanced and fair, while more easily seeing others as biased. 13 For instance, in a 2017 survey of forensic science examiners, approximately 71% agreed that cognitive bias is a cause for concern in forensics, but only 26% agreed that it impacted their own judgments. 14 These issues may be pronounced for intuitive, subjective, or experience-based forms of expertise, because such expertise does not follow a chain of reasoning that can be scrutinized for bias. 15 We use the term "bias" broadly in this article to describe any systematic error in reasoning and thinking that can alter an individual's memory, perception, and decision making. 16 In this manner, there are several causes and forms of bias (and we do not intend to provide an exhaustive list). In the interest of brevity, and in light of the existing research examining these 10 Richard H Thaler & Cass A Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness (London, England: Penguin, 2009) concepts, we will provide only a cursory (and bulleted) overview:
• A relationship or what Paciocco referred to as an association bias. 17 Simply being assigned a side (even at random) can unconsciously bias an expert toward that side. 18 Additionally, many forensic experts work for the police (some forensic crime laboratories are even part of the prosecuting District Attorney's Office), which can also be a source of organizational relationship bias. • A tangible reward. A financial stake in the outcome of a case (including the possibility of being retained again) may unconsciously bias the expert in favour of one side. 19 • Pre-existing views and selection bias. 20 An expert may be selected because he or she has a particular view on an issue, which may diverge from the consensus in the field. 21 For example, there may be a dispute in real estate about how to most accurately assign a value to property. The court will have a hard time knowing whether the expert's view is orthodox because parties will be motivated to retain a witness whose opinion accords with their case theory. Preexisting views (including whether an accused is guilty or innocent) 17 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 577.
18
See Daniel C Murrie et al, "Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side That Retained Them?" (2013) 24:10 Psychological Science 1889. In the Murrie et al study, practicing forensic psychologists were told they were retained by the defence or prosecution with minimal instructions as to how they should perform their assessment task: "The attorney addressed the defense-allegiance participants with statements that are typical of many defense attorneys (e.g. 'We try to help the court understand that the data show not every sex offender really poses a high risk of reoffending'). Likewise, he addressed participants in the prosecution-allegiance condition with statements that are typical of prosecutors (e.g. 'We try to help the court understand that the offenders we bring to trial are a select group whom the data show are more likely than other sex offenders to reoffend'). In both conditions, he asked participants to score the offenders using the two risk instruments. He also hinted at the possibility of future opportunities for paid consultation." [Murrie, Forensic Experts].
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Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 577; Bernstein, supra note 11 at 455. 20 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 575-584.
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Ibid. This view may result from a "professional bias", such as a practitioner of a certain methodology seeking to defend that method despite evidence suggesting it is flawed. It may also flow from "noble cause distortion", with experts in some areas seeing themselves on the "side of good", thus making it morally acceptable (in their minds) to dissemble in their evidence and testimony. may result in confirmation bias, as the expert tends to distort information to fit that view. 22 • Contextual bias. Contextual information, such as emotional case facts or whether the accused confessed, has a demonstrable and well-supported impact on decision making. 23 This biasing contextual information can impact relatively robust domains of forensic science, such as fingerprinting 24 and DNA. 25 Oftentimes, such information is irrelevant to the expert's task. 26 Contextual bias, although the focus of a great deal of recent scientific research, is rarely expressly considered by courts. 27 • Bias cascades. Biases not only impact an individual expert at one stage of the investigation, but they can cascade to other aspects of the investigation and also impact other experts and legal professionals. 28 For instance, a crime scene investigator may be impacted by irrelevant contextual information at the crime scene, and then also be impacted by the same biasing information when her or she analyzes the evidence back at the crime laboratory. Hence, the bias cascades from one aspect (CSI) to another aspect (analytic work in the crime laboratory) of the investigation. • Bias snowball. Bias can also snowball when forensic examiners are exposed to irrelevant details about the case and then share these details as well as their biased conclusion or case theory with another examiner. Bias then snowballs (i.e., increases in magnitude) because the bias now has a double impact (i.e., the direct impact of the biasing information itself, as well as its indirect impact via the conclusion of the other examiner). Then, more bias snowballing can occur when the factfinder hears from both examiners, each presenting their finding as if they are independent lines of evidence. 29 The various biases listed above can originate from three general sources:
(1) specific case-related information, (2) wider factors relating to the expert and the environment, and (3) human nature (see Figure 1 ). Specific case-related information includes any irrelevant information that experts do not need in order to do their work (e.g., police suspicions, 29 Dror, Snowball, supra note 28. 30 Dror, Sources of Bias, supra note 37. information about the investigation, emotionally evocative case facts, the suspect's past criminal record, their race or religion). 31 This is commonly referred to as "domain irrelevant information." 32 In addition, sometimes even relevant information, such as reference materials (e.g. the suspect's fingerprint, DNA, handwriting, etc) can bias an expert's opinion or analysis. 33 To illustrate, an expert who is presented with a suspect's reference materials may perceive or interpret the actual evidence from the crime scene in a way that is consistent with those of the suspect. That is, the expert goes backwards from the suspect to the evidence, rather than from the evidence to the suspect; this phenomenon has been termed "suspect/target driven bias." 34 The wider factors that can bias experts include their experience, training, background, motivation, and organizational culture. 35 And lastly, the biasing factors related to fundamental human nature arise from cognitive architecture and how the brain processes information. For example, humans use unconscious mental shortcuts known as heuristics that produce economies but can slant judgment away from rational outcomes in many cases. 36 These are independent of the specific case and the expert involved. 37 Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize that research findings are clear: experts are not immune to any of the biases and contextual influences discussed above. 38 Influential legal decisions (and later, WBLI itself) generally do not engage with the science of cognitive bias, and, perhaps as a result, simply classify biases into two categories: independence and partiality. 39 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 572: "As has been pointed out, bias can be a function either of a lack of independence or a lack of impartiality." National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance, [1993] FSR 563 at 565, [1993] 2 Lloyd's LR Independence concerns the expert's relationship with either the parties to the litigation (e.g., a friendship with the defendant) or with the litigation itself (e.g., a financial stake in the outcome.) Courts generally accept some level of non-independence, as experts are typically retained and paid by one party. 40 Partiality refers to the expert's biased state of mind or attitude, and generally manifests itself in some sort of behaviour. 41 It may flow from nonindependence, a pre-existing belief, contextual cues, or other similar sources.
III. ADDRESSING BIAS IN COURTS
There is the tendency in every expert to have an unconscious bias in favour of the party who calls him as a witness. 42
Given the many influences that can slant an expert's judgment, courts have, unsurprisingly, been concerned with the objectivity of experts for centuries. 43 However, an English decision from the early 1990s, National Justice Compania Niveira S.A. v Prudential Assurance ("The Ikarian Reefer") is often credited with the modern interest in bias. 44 In that case, Creswell J, troubled by a protracted battle of experts, laid out several duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses (e.g. independence, impartiality). 45 The Ikarian Reefer inspired a great deal of procedural reform (e.g. expert codes of conduct, jointly appointed experts) and wide acceptance that experts owed a duty of independence and impartiality. 46 68 [The Ikarian Reefer]; Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5 at 638-638; WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 48-49. See also Mewett & Sankoff, supra note 6 at chapter 16.8(ii)-(iii). 40 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 573.
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Ibid; Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5 at 638-639. 42 Earle Smith Construction Co v Aylmer High School Board, [1940] The Ikarian Reefer, supra note 39; WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 26-32; Gary Edmond, "After Objectivity: Expert Evidence and Procedural Reform" (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 131 [Edmond, After Objectivity]. 45 The Ikarian Reefer, supra note 39 at 565. 46 For a review in Canada see Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 585; Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5 at 641-646. In Australia, see Edmond, After Objectivity, supra note 44. For post-Ikarian Reefer interest in the experts' duties, see DD, supra note 8; Still, the existence of such a duty and new procedures can only go so far. As we discussed above, experts will rarely be aware of their biases, and therefore simply reminding them of their duty to be objective and impartial may often prove ineffective. Moreover, even if experts are aware of their biases, such biases cannot simply be overcome through mere willpower. 47 Indeed, even in the face of admonitions from bodies like the National Academy of Sciences about the danger of cognitive biases in the forensic sciences, forensic examiners -testifying in court -continue to deny the importance of blinding themselves to biasing information. 48 As a result, it may be that simply demanding expert witnesses be "objective" (a somewhat nebulous notion itself) is not enough, raising the question of whether a potentially biased expert ought to be excluded altogether. 49 In Canada, post-Ikarian Reefer cases disagreed about whether it was appropriate to exclude experts who appeared to violate their duty to the court (although, as we will see, many courts did opt to exclude experts for bias). 50 Some courts and commentators suggested that the influential Ontario appellate decision in R v Abbey opened the door to excluding biased testimony under the trial judge's residual discretion to exclude evidence when its costs exceed its benefits to the trial process (with bias diminishing the benefits of admitting the evidence through reduced reliability). 51 These 47 Dror, Biases in forensic experts, supra note 4. 48 Gary Edmond, David Hamer & Emma Cunliffe, "A little ignorance is a dangerous thing: engaging with exogenous knowledge not adduced by the parties" (2016) 25:3 Griffith L Rev 383; Edmond, After Objectivity, supra note 44; Jason M Chin & D'Arcy White, "Forensic Bitemark Identification Evidence in Canada" (2019) 52:1 UBC L Rev 57. 49 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 589-591. Edmond, After Objectivity, supra note 44. R v Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624 at para 87: "When one looks to potential probative value, one must consider the reliability of the evidence. Reliability concerns reach not only the subject matter of the evidence, but also the extent to which the expert is shown to be impartial and objective". See Van Bree, supra note 50 at paras 36-56, 97; Lisa Dufraimont, "New Challenges for the Gatekeeper: The Evolving Law on Expert Evidence in Criminal Cases" (2012) 58:3/4 Crim LQ 531 at 553-554. cases, along with influential academic scrutiny of the Canadian judicial approach to bias, set the stage for WBLI. 52
IV. WHITE BURGESS LANGILLE V ABBOTT AND HALIBURTON CO
WBLI expanded -in form -the Canadian approach to potentially biased experts in two principal ways. First, it confirmed that concerns about an expert's bias go to both weight and admissibility. 53 Second, Cromwell J, writing for the court, held that (some level of) unbiasedness is both a factor in the trial judge's discretionary exclusion of expert evidence (based on weighing its probative value and prejudicial effect) and a threshold requirement. 54 As to the threshold inquiry, the Court held that bias ought to be considered under Mohan's "properly qualified expert" element. 55 Moreover, this threshold can generally be met with the expert's recognition (and oath) as to his or her duty to the court to be independent and impartial. 56 A challenge establishing a "realistic concern" that the expert is "unable and/or unwilling to comply with that duty" 57 then shifts the burden to the party 52 See Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11; Hon S Casey Hill et al., McWillams' Canadian Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2008) (loose-leaf, 4th ed) at 12-58 [McWilliams] . The approach of the authors of McWilliams and Paciocco was, for the most part, ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. Compare Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 595-599 with WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 52-54. The Supreme Court in WBLI also relied heavily on Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5, which argued against an exclusionary rule in the context of civil trials. 53 See the sources at supra note 50. 54 WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 52-54. 55 Ibid at para 53. The full expert evidence admissibility rule (which gradually evolved from Mohan to Abbey, and then to White Burgess) can be summarized as follows: "Under the first step of the test, the opinion must meet four preconditions: logical relevance, absence of an exclusionary rule, a properly qualified expert, and necessity (note Abbey had relegated necessity to the second stage). Further, novel or contested science must receive special reliability scrutiny...If the evidence passes the first step, only then does it receive the discretionary costs-benefits weighing, which also includes reliability and any bias or partiality the expert may possess."; Jason M Chin, "Abbey Road: The (ongoing) journey to reliable expert evidence" (2018) Can Bar Rev 96:3 422 at 429 [citations omitted]. See WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 14-25. 56 The court largely adopted the framework proposed by Professor (as he then was) Paciocco and the authors of McWilliams, see supra note 52. 57 WBLI, supra note 5 at para 48.
proffering the expert to prove otherwise. 58 The Court was also careful to state that the threshold was "not particularly onerous" and that it would be "quite rare that a proposed expert's evidence would be ruled inadmissible." 59 As to what level of biasedness would warrant exclusion, the Court seemed to rely on the two general categories of bias outlined above: independence and impartiality. 60 The court noted that independence can be interfered with by the expert's interest in or relationship to the current proceeding. 61 On this point, Cromwell J said that a direct financial interest in the outcome of the case or a very close familiar relationship with one of the parties may be cause for concern, but mere employment with a party would likely be insufficient to exclude the expert. 62 The second category includes any sort of demonstrable partiality, such as assuming "the role of an advocate." 63 In either case, the Court clarified that a mere reasonable apprehension of bias, the standard used for disqualifying judges and administrative decision makers, was inapplicable. 64 Rather, as stated above, the test is whether the expert is unwilling or unable to comply with his or her duty to the court. 65 The Court also held that concerns about 58 Ibid. This must be established on a balance of probabilities. 59 Ibid at para 49. 60 Ibid at paras 32, 49. The first prong seems to align with what the Court referred to earlier as impartiality and bias: "The expert's opinion must be impartial in the sense that it reflects an objective assessment of the questions at hand…. It must be unbiased in the sense that it does not unfairly favour one party's position over another." The second aligns with a lack of independence: "It must be independent in the sense that it is the product of the expert's independent judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or her or the outcome of the litigation." They also generally correspond with the categories provided by Peter Sankoff (Mewett & Sankoff, supra note 6 at 16.8(ii)-(iii)) in his analysis of case law: "interest in the proceeding" and "demonstrated absence of objectivity". See also Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5 at 642-644; Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 573-574. 61 WBLI, supra note 5 at para 49. 62 Ibid. 63 WBLI, supra note 5 at para 49. Examples of this prong cited in WBLI, supra note 5 at para 37. See also Michell & Mandhane, supra note 5 at 648. 64 WBLI, supra note 5 at para 50. 65 In WBLI itself, the impugned expert was a partner at a the accounting firm that initially discovered the alleged accounting errors that formed the basis of the claim (albeit a different office than the one that found the errors). The defendants argued that the partner was not independent, inter alia, because she would have to opine on the work on her own firm. The Supreme Court found that this level of bias did not meet their independence and impartiality should factor into the trial judge's residual discretion to exclude evidence when its costs outweigh its benefits. 66 WBLI is undoubtedly an important case. 67 It provides useful clarification on the place of bias in the Mohan test. Indeed, as Cromwell J stated, inserting bias into the test, "ensures that the courts will focus expressly on the important risks associated with biased experts." 68 The case also walks a fine line. While arguably adding to the trial judge's gatekeeping responsibilities, it set a high bar for establishing bias. In doing so, it recognized that the reality of an adversarial system is that an expert witness will feel some level of allegiance with the party calling him or her. 69 Therefore, there is a question as to whether such an approach would actually lead to more exclusions, or if its main contribution would be in simply making courts and advocates more aware of issues of expert bias.
V. BIAS CASES, PRE-AND POST-WHITE BURGESS
In our study of pre-and post-WBLI decisions, we sought to examine what effect an exclusionary rule would have on expert bias jurisprudence. Did it inspire more challenges? Were experts more likely to be excluded or see the weight accorded to their evidence reduced? And if there was a discernable effect, was it felt more in criminal or civil cases? Moreover, we hope that compiling these cases will be of use to practitioners and evidence scholars.
First, we created a database of decisions in which an expert was challenged for bias. To do this, we searched the WestlawNext Canada 70 online database under "All Cases and Decisions" for the following words in the body of the judgment: impartial, impartiality, partial, bias, biased, independent, independence, advocate, and advocacy. 71 For the pre-WBLI new test. The expert appeared to understand her duty to the court and the connection between her work and possible losses to her firm (e.g. should she find their initial work was shoddy) were speculative. See WBLI, supra note 5 at paras 56-62. 66 Ibid at paras 54-55. 67 See Sankoff & Mewett, supra note 6 at chapter 16.8.
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WBLI, supra note 5 at para 53, citing McWilliams, supra note 52 and Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 [emphasis added]. 69 Edmond, After Objectivity, supra note 44. 70 Online: <www.westlawnextcanada.com/>. 71 We limited our search to expert evidence cases by restricting it to cases in which "expert" was in the headnote and (1) "Mohan" was anywhere in the case (for pre-WBLI cases), or case law, we searched the five years before the WBLI decision was handed down (May 1, 2010 to April 30, 2015 . For the post-WBLI case law, we searched from May 1, 2015 to May 28, 2018 (i.e., just over three years after the case was decided). 72 We pre-registered (predefined) our search parameters and time window before collecting and examining the data to help ensure that any expectations we had would not influence the results. 73 This practice is in line with current best practices in social scientific methods. 74 The second author (Lutsky) then reviewed the cases and screened out those based on pre-registered specifications (e.g., "bias" was used in a different context or only to summarize the law, see Appendix A). The remainder were deemed "relevant." The first author (Chin) reviewed 10% of these choices, and Lutsky and Chin discussed any difficult-to-categorize cases. 75 We treated any distinct instance of an expert being challenged for bias as a "decision" for the purposes of our study (i.e., any given reported case could contain multiple "decisions" if multiple experts were challenged (2) "White Burgess" or "Mohan" was anywhere in the case (for post-WBLI cases). See supplementary material, online: <https://osf.io/awy5v/> for the precise search strings we used. 72 We classified one case that was decided temporally after WBLI as a pre-WBLI decision because the case was heard before WBLI and decided not long after WBLI. As a result, we did not think that WBLI would have been available to the parties. That case is R v J (N), 2015 ONSC 4347. For a full description of how we classified cases during the preand post-WBLI interstitial period, see Supplementary Materials, online <https://osf.io/awy5v/>. For example, we excluded from our database Gaudet v Grewal, 2014 ONSC 3542 because the expert was challenged but died before he could give evidence, making it difficult to know how the court would have ultimately decided. We also excluded McKerr v CML Healthcare Inc, 2012 BCSC 1712 because although the term objectivity was used with respect a description of the expert, it was not in the context of an admissibility challenge.
for bias for different reasons). This resulted in 229 "relevant decisions," 76 comprising 113 pre-WBLI and 116 post-WBLI decisions. 77 A full list of these cases is available at Appendix B.
Lutsky then reviewed these cases and coded them according to preregistered criteria (see Appendix A). Importantly, cases were coded according to whether the court found potential indicators of either the expert's (1) independence (through a connection to the party or possible interest in the outcome), (2) demonstrated partiality (usually through the behaviour of the expert), or (3) both. Appendix A contains a further description of how these decisions were made with examples of such categorizations. For instance, potential non-independence was described by courts in situations when the expert was an employee of a party, 78 a friend of a party, 79 or a police officer investigating the alleged crime. 80 Partiality included being argumentative, 81 discounting evidence consistent with the other side's case, 82 and straying into legal argument. 83 Lutsky then coded these cases based on whether the evidence was: excluded (or assigned no weight, which we construed as an effective exclusion for the purposes of this study) for bias (i.e., non-independence or partiality); excluded for other reasons; admitted; or expressly assigned less weight by the trial judge for bias. 84 Once again Chin reviewed both 10% of these choices and difficult-to-categorize cases. 85 76 See the full database online: <https://osf.io/hqyv5/>. If two experts were challenged for the same reasons and the same reasons were given for admitting or excluding them, this was treated as one line of data. For a full accounting of this process, see the online supplementary material, online: <https://osf.io/awy5v/>. For practicality, cases in which the expert was excluded for bias and other reasons were coded as excluded for bias. Those cases are flagged in the main data file, see online <https://osf.io/hqyv5/>. The exception is R v Ennis-Taylor 2017 ONSC 5797, in which the trial judge expressly said that bias alone would not have been enough to exclude the evidence. 85 For example, it was sometimes difficult to determine if an expert was excluded, given reduced weight, or neither. For instance, in Uponor AB v Heatlink Group Inc., 2016 FC Before reporting our findings, a key limitation of our study should be highlighted: our research contains only reported decisions (on one commercial database). Certainly, experts' alleged bias has been judicially considered in many decisions we do not have access to (e.g., mid-trial oral evidentiary holdings). In fact, one recent estimate found that only about 2% of criminal cases are ultimately reported. 86 Moreover, we have no information on the frequency at which potentially biased expert evidence produces settlements and plea deals. That said, we believe the cases we researched are important. It is the body of case law that litigators and courts have the most access to, and so these cases form the most accessible precedent on the issue of biased experts.
First, we calculated the total number of relevant decisions per year (i.e., the number of times in which an expert's bias was at issue). As shown in Figure 2 , there was a relatively steady number of such reported cases (about 20-30) in years before WBLI was decided. The year immediately after WBLI saw a considerable uptick in bias cases (e.g., 26 challenges in 2014 nearly doubled to 51 in 2016). This increase may be attributable to parties testing the boundaries of the new doctrine. As can also be seen from Figure 2 , despite WBLI seeming to inspire more bias challenges, the actual number of exclusions for bias has remained relatively steady, with a slight increase after WBLI (9 in 2012, 5 in 2013, 7 in 2014, 16 in 2015, 13 in 2016, and 12 in 2016) .
The rate of exclusion for bias (non-independence or partiality) was remarkably similar pre-and post-WBLI, with a slightly lower rate (31.0%) after the case was decided, as compared to before (32.7%). The year in which WBLI was decided may be particularly illustrative: in 2015, decisions that had the benefit of WBLI excluded experts 34.8% of the time, compared to 57.1% in 2015 cases that came before it. Similarly, judges pre-WBLI expressly assigned less weight to expert evidence because of bias in 11.5% of relevant decisions and in 10.3% of such decisions after WBLI. This suggests that either WBLI did not strongly expand the reasons for which an expert could be excluded for bias or that the post-WBLI challenges were less meritorious, or some combination of the two. In either case, it does not support the theory that WBLI changed the practical operation of the law in an extreme fashion (and perhaps not at all).
We also analyzed WBLI's effect on the admission of experts in criminal and civil cases. Research in the U.S. has found that new (ostensibly more rigorous) standards for admitting experts has affected civil trials more than criminal trials, with more demanding requirements disproportionately imposed on experts in civil trials. 87 We found that before WBLI, experts in civil cases were successfully excluded for bias in 42.4% of cases, but only in 19.1% of criminal cases. This considerable difference may be due, in part, to the fact that experts in criminal trials are typically tendered by the Crown. The defence is often limited in resources, and thus may not have the capacity to mount a successful challenge (as compared to more equally matched parties in civil trials). 88 This effect is also somewhat surprising because civil trials are typically decided by a judge alone and thus are cases when the judge is likely to relax his or her gatekeeping of expert evidence (it may also indicate some bias in our sample whereby evidentiary decisions in criminal trials are less likely to be reported). 89 For reasons that are not immediately clear, WBLI did appear to impact civil cases the most, with that 42.4% exclusion rate dropping to 34.2%. In the criminal sphere, those challenging experts for bias fared somewhat better, with the exclusion rate increasing about 5% to 24.3%. 90 As to the type of bias experts are excluded for, there was not a dramatic change after WBLI. Before WBLI, independence challenges were successful (i.e., the expert was ultimately excluded for lack of independence when it was raised) 22.6% of the time and impartiality challenges were successful 42.9% of the time. After WBLI, independence challenges found slightly more success than they had before (25.8%), whereas the success rate for impartiality challenges slightly dropped (40.9%).
Finally, we examined the part of the expert evidence test that experts are evaluated under. Post-WBLI, challenges under the "properly qualified expert" criterion found success in 32.7% of such instances. This compares Chan v Erin Mills Town Centre Corp, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741 at para 31, 143 ACWS (3d) 1143. Further, WBLI was a civil case and thus may present a more clearly relevant precedent in that area. 90 As to reductions in weight due to bias, that occurred in 7.6% of relevant civil decisions before WBLI and 8.9% of cases afterwards. This rate fell for criminal cases, from 17.0% to 13.5%. to a 60% exclusion rate of such experts considered under the trial judge's discretionary gatekeeping exercise. This may be due to the high bar (for bias) set in out WBLI's enunciation of threshold non-biasedness and generally increased exclusion (as suggested in other work) at the discretionary gatekeeping stage. 91
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our findings suggest that, following WBLI, there was an increase in the frequency of challenges related to expert biases. This may be the result of parties testing the boundaries of the new precedent with relatively weak arguments for bias. Despite the increased activity in this area, it is surprising how little an impact WBLI had across the metrics we explored. Most notably, the number of experts excluded for bias remained relatively constant between pre-and post-WBLI cases. One explanation for this is that WBLI did not meaningfully change the law, but simply confirmed and formally articulated a rule that lower courts were already applying. 92 This is a theory that our empirical analysis is limited in its ability to address (we hope, however, that the database we have compiled will assist with such work). Still, in this section, we will offer some preliminary observations based on our review of the cases. In general, we will suggest that one way for the courts to develop the expert bias jurisprudence in a manner that is sensitive to the psychology of bias is to broaden their independence inquiry to include questions specifically about contextual bias.
Recall that both before and after WBLI, the success rate for impartiality challenges was higher than that for independence challenges (and both only changed by a few percentage points). This consistency suggests that courts 91 WBLI, supra note 5 at para 49; Emma Cunliffe, "A New Canadian Paradigm? Judicial Gatekeeping and the Reliability of Expert Evidence" in Paul Roberts & Michael Stockdale, eds, Forensic Science Evidence and Expert Witness Testimony: Reliability Through Reform? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 310. In generally balancing an expert's contribution to the case versus the prejudice he or she presents, and the defence's ability to address that prejudice, see Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, "A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical Evidence" (2011) 61:3 UTLJ 343. 92 Indeed, one post WBLI appellate decision noted that Professor (as he then was) Paciocco's framework, that was adopted in WBLI, was wholly adopted by the case's trial court. R v Natsis, 2018 ONCA 425 at para 9 [Natsis ONCA]; R v Natsis, 2014 ONCJ 532 [Natsis ONCJ]. are more sensitive to impartiality challenges, an observation buttressed by the fact that partiality is typically defined as being behavioural and attitudinal, making it relatively easy to observe. 93 Moreover, impartiality challenges may justify exclusion of an expert not simply because they indicate bias, but also because they cast doubt on the reliability of an expert's opinion (an exclusionary rule that predates WBLI). 94 To better illustrate what constitutes excludable partiality, the following list contains the expert behaviours that commonly led to exclusion in both pre-and post-WBLI cases:
• As to independence, both before and after WBLI, a rather strong connection to the case, parties, or issues was required to justify exclusion. Before WBLI, these included a direct financial interest, 102 being asked to opine on the reliability or quality of their own work, 103 strong professional advocacy on a relevant issue, 104 and deep involvement in the investigation or allegiance with investigators. 105 Very similar reasons resulted in exclusion after WBLI. 106 Moreover, a controversial case decided before WBLI was affirmed in light of the new doctrine. 107 Despite its largely neutral effect, one positive outcome from WBLI is that it appeared to increase the discussion around confirmation bias. Within our search, none of the cases before WBLI mentioned confirmation bias, while eight cases expressly mentioned it after WBLI. 108 Some of this interest in confirmation bias may flow from Paciocco's influential pre-WBLI article, which contained a substantial treatment of confirmation bias. 109 Nevertheless, this recognition by the courts of a specific psychological bias marks a step forward in expert witness jurisprudence. To continue moving forward, and to further increase judicial control over biased experts in the Natsis ONCA, supra note 92 at para 9. The Court of Appeal for Ontario noted that the trial judge had applied Professor (as he then was) Paciocco's framework, which was adopted in WBLI. Clair Boating & Marina v Michigan Electric Supply Co, 2017 ONSC 23 at para 82; R v Piechotta, 2016 BCPC 463 at paras 185-186; R v France, 2017 ONSC 2040 Giles, supra note 97 at 123; AE v TE, 2017 ABQB 449 at para 178; R v Hood, 2016 NSPC 19 at para 144; Young v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2017 BCSC 2306 at para 6; Van Bree, supra note 50 at 103. 109 Paciocco, Jukebox, supra note 11 at 577-581. future, we recommend courts broaden their bias analysis to include consideration of contextual bias. 110 Recall that psychological research has found that contextual factors (e.g., emotionally evocative facts, the perceived exigency of the situation) substantially alter perception, memory, and judgment. 111 Notwithstanding this research, none of the judgements in our search included any express discussion of contextual bias (similar inadvertence has also been noted in Australia and the UK), 112 nor have there been any discussions on the use of bias countermeasures, such as Linear Sequential Unmasking (i.e., progressively exposing experts to just the evidence they must know to perform their task). 113 Moreover, independence challenges related to an expert's exposure to irrelevant and extraneous (but biasing) information are treated inconsistently. These types of challenges are most often raised when a proposed expert participated in a related investigation before the proceeding. Within our analysis, we found seven instances where an expert was permitted to testify despite their involvement in a related investigation, 114 and five instances where an expert's involvement in a related investigation was used as reason to reject their testimony. 115 What is likely contributing to this inconsistency is the absence of any discussion of contextual bias by the courts. Edmond et al, Contextual Bias, supra note 23 at n 2: "We identified no sustained discussion or responses to 'contextual bias' or 'cognitive bias' in reported appellate judgments in England, Australia and Canada, though there are several passing references…" But, see R v Smith-Wilson, 2016 SKQB 33 at paras 150-151 in which the expert failed to mention in her report that she had been exposed to biasing information. v Ali, 2011 BCSC 1850 R v Parisien, 2011 ONCJ 354 at para 13 [Parisien]; R v Pelich, 2012 ONSC 3224 at paras 18-21; Market Surveillance Administrator, Re, 2015 CarswellAlta 1400 paras 91, 111, [2015 R v Tang, 2015 ONCA 470 paras 6-7; R v Dixon, 2015 ONSC 8065 at paras 47-50; R v Farnham, 2016 SKCA 111 at paras 78, 85 [Farnham] . 115 Van Bree, supra note 50 at para 116-118, R v Tremblett, 2012 NSPC 121 at paras 9, 29, 33;  Ontario v Advanced Construction, supra note 78 at para 86; BC Hydro supra note 106 at paras 28-29; R v Fabos, 2015 ONSC 8013 at para 47. To better control for contextual bias, and to resolve the inconsistency discussed above, courts should more critically consider an expert's exposure to contextual information when conducting their independence analysis. Several of the cases we reviewed may have benefited from such an exercise. For instance, in R v Live Nation Canada, the engineers who gave expert testimony were present at the accident and witnessed the deaths of numerous people. 116 In this case, and in several others like it, 117 the trial judge seemed to place significant weight on the expert's demeanor (e.g. whether the expert appeared an honest witness) and the expert's denials regarding their susceptibility to contextual factors. Given that experts may not be aware when they fall victim to contextual bias, relying on their demeanour or confidence in their own opinion is, in our view, misguided. This is similar to the case of the confident but mistaken eye witness; a phenomenon that has been widely discussed in both the psychological and legal literature. 118 We believe similar emphasis should be placed on the potential for contextual bias to sway the opinions of experts. In addition to screening out potentially inaccurate evidence, taking contextual bias more seriously at trial may encourage parties and investigators to keep such biasing information from the experts in the first place.
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To conclude, while our analysis of the Canadian approach and the impact of WBLI has been generally pessimistic, it does seem to have had a salutary effect on the coherence of evidence law. As we discussed above, WBLI ended the debate about whether bias could be cause to exclude an expert and provided some clarity about how much bias was sufficient for exclusion (e.g., a reasonable apprehension is insufficient). 119 This clarity is useful in less obvious ways as well. Consider, for instance, Matsalla v Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc, in which the court noted that while some Saskatchewan civil procedure rules established a duty of objectivity, such rules were not applicable in small claims court. 120 The lack of directly 116 R v Live Nation Canada, 2016 ONCJ 22 at para 5. 117 Farnham, supra note 114 at para 78; Parisien, supra note 114 at para 1. 118 See Chin & Crozier, supra note 8 at 636 119 See the sources at supra note 50. Some pre-WBLI decisions did rely on a reasonable apprehension of bias, see Van Bree, supra note 50 at para 110: "The advantage of using a reasonable person standard is that the reasonable person assessing the appearance of bias must be informed of all the relevant circumstances, including the background factors that uphold the impartiality of the witness. As will be seen, I find this to be a factor tending to diminish appearances of bias of police officers.".
120
Matsalla v Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc, 2017 SKQB 335 at para 25. relevant legislation might have prompted a great deal of analysis as to why the Small Claims Act Rules and Regulations were not similarly drafted. 121 The court, however, quickly noted the precedent in WBLI and its explanation of the expert's duty. The matter was then easily decided. This economy and clarity are certainly beneficial, but perhaps it is now time to move on to certain subtler and thornier issues inherent in the biases of experts. 121 The Small Claims Act, 1997 , SS 1997 ; RRS c S-50.11 Reg 1.
Appendix A. Methodological Details
Appendix A. Selected details about our methodology. For a full accounting see the online supplementary materials: <https://osf.io/awy5v/> and preregistration: <https://osf.io/ed8f5/>. (0): Situations where the Court does not identify any relationship/connection between the expert and either party that could potentially affect the expert's ability to be impartial.
Determination of a decision
• Partiality o Yes (1): Situations where the Court acknowledges that the expert's report/testimony potentially demonstrates that he or she has a bias towards one of the parties. Importantly, this includes situations where the Court ultimately concludes that the expert did not engage in partial behaviour in his or her testimony/report. For example, in Conseil Scolaire Francophone de la Colmbie-Britaanique (2014 BCSC 851 at paras 37, 51), the impartiality of an expert was questioned due to her evasiveness during cross-examination. Specifically, the expert often disputed with counsel the form of question she was asked. The court agreed that the expert was evasive, however attributed her evasiveness due to her carefulness with language. The court explained that the expert wanted to be precise with her words, which should not be seen as a demonstration of biased behaviour. The behaviour of the expert in that case is an example of potentially partial/biased behaviour which the court ultimately concluded was not a demonstration of bias/partiality. 
